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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
KALOB TED KEPPLER,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Case No. 980182-CA

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal was conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfromthe trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for dismissal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-403 "Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for
offense out of same episode." Appellant Keppler entered a condition guilty plea to a Third
Degree Felony, in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8 "Possession of a Controlled Substance," the
Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield, First District Court, presiding. The Defendant was sentenced
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on March 24, 1998, to one term of zero to five years. Execution of the sentence was stayed and
the defendant was placed on 36 months probation with standard conditions including twenty-one
days jail. The twenty-one day jail sentence was also stayed pending the results of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant Keppler argues that where he has pleaded guilty as charged to conduct arising
from a single criminal episode, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-403 precludes the state from
bringing a second prosecution charging offenses arising from the same episode.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law and thus is reviewed
for correctness and accorded no particular deference. State v. Straden 902 P.2d 638, (Utah App.
1995) (Cert, denied 1996).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE COURT BELOW
Appellant Keppler preserved this issue for appeal by submitting a written motion for
dismissal which motion was denied in a memorandum decision after oral argument. Keppler then
entered a conditional guilty plea as allowed under State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah
App. 1988). (Memorandum Decision, 24 November, 1997, pp 1-2).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-403 — (see addendum B)

2

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Kalob Ted Keppler ("Keppler"), appealsfromconviction on one count
"POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE," a Third Degree Felony, in violation of
U.C.A. § 58-37-8. Keppler entered a conditional guilty plea, the Honorable Judge Ben H.
Hadfield, First District Court, presiding, after the court denied his motion to dismiss in a
memorandum decision dated November 24, 1997. Sentencing was on March 24, 1998, and
Keppler was sentenced to one term of zero tofiveyears. Execution of the sentence was stayed,
Keppler was placed on 36 months probation and was ordered to serve 21 days in the Box Elder
County jail. Execution of the 21 days jail was stayed pending the results of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE RECORD
On April 5, 1997, defendant, Kalob Ted Keppler, was arrested and given a citation for
possession of drug paraphernalia. (State's memorandum p. 1). On April 14, 1997, Keppler
appeared before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, First District Court, upon the citation issued to
him at the time of his arrest, and pleaded guilty to the charge "Use or Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia." (Certified copy of conviction, April 14, 1997). The Court accepted defendant's
guilty pleas and sentenced defendant on both counts. (Certified copy of conviction, April 14,
1997). On April 14, 1997, the same day of defendant's guilty plea and sentencing, the Box Elder
County Attorney's office filed an information in First District Court charging defendant again with
the Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
However, the information additionally charged Keppler with Possession of Methamphetamine, a
3rd Degree Felony. (State's Memorandum p. 2). The County Attorney's information was based
upon evidence obtained incident to defendant's arrest on April 5, 1997, and duplicated the charge
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to which Keppler had pleaded guilty. (State's Memorandum pp 2-3; and, Certified copy of
conviction. April 14, 1997). Keppler filed a motion to dismiss based on Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-403 to which the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying the motion and finding
that Keppler's possession of paraphernalia and the possession of Methamphetamine "are not a
single criminal episode because they do not have a common criminal objective." (Memorandum
Decision. Nov. 24, 1997). The trial court supported its finding upon the fact that "[t]here is no
evidence that the marijuana pipe was, or could be, used to ingest or consume the
methamphetamine." (Memorandum Decision. Nov. 24, 1997).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, by determining that this charge did not have a common criminal
objective with the previously prosecuted charge of possession of paraphernalia.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by finding that possession of drug paraphernalia and
possession of Methamphetamine do not have a common criminal objective.
There are two cases which address this point: State v. Strader. 903 P.2d 638, (Utah App.
1995), and State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, (Utah App. 1997). In the Strader case, defendant
Strader sought to apply the same criminal episode protection of § 76-1-403 to the offenses of
false identification, theft, and possession of a controlled substance. The trial court in Strader was
affirmed in its finding that the offense of false identification does not have the same criminal
objective as the offenses of theft or possession of controlled substance. The Strader decision
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turned on the fact that "a crime committed to avoid arrest for a prior crime cannot always be
considered as part of the same criminal episode." Id at 644, FN9, (citing State v. Cornish, 571
P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977). Therefore, Strader established that the offense of false identification
is a separate criminal episodefromthe offenses of possession of a controlled substance and theft.
In State v. Patience defendant Patience sought joinder of several counts of forgery. The trial
court in Patience was upheld in denying joinder of forgery counts, inter alia, on the basis that "the
forgery of several documents even in the course of one transaction constitutes a separate offense
for each instrument because the essence of the crime of forgery is not the end, i.e., what is
obtained by the forgery, but the means, e.g., by signing the name of another with intent to
defraud." Patience, at 392, FN 14.
However, appellant Keppler argues that illegal possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia have the same criminal objective: The goal, the aim, that to
which the effort was directed, was illicitly to use controlled substances. There is no distinction to
be found in the criminal objective of these offenses. And, since there is no dispute that the other
elements of § 76-1-403 are met, the charge of possession of methamphetamine should be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Keppler prays the Court to overturn his conviction. The legislature has imposed
a mandate that defendants shall be once prosecuted for offenses arisingfromthe same criminal
episode. Allowing a second prosecution in this case would violate that mandate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day ofSegtem^er, 1998.
i^nMcfGaW^252'
Attorney forAppellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing
"Appellant's Brief to the following:
Attorney General's Office
ATTN: Criminal Appeals
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
DATED this 3rd day of September, 1998.

Kjxfa McGaha
'Attorney for Ap
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.

;i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

]
i

CASE NO. 971100051 FS

KALOB TED KEPPLER,
JUDGE BEN H. HADFIELD
DEFENDANT.

)

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss. The Defendant argues that the pending charges should be dismissed
because the Defendant has already entered a guilty plea to Use Or Possession Of
Drug Paraphernalia, a Class "B" Misdemeanor. The guilty plea was made on the same
date that the formal Information containing the felony charge was filed. The
misdemeanor charge had been issued by the officer through the means of a citation.
Pursuant to U.C.A. 76-1-403(3), the plea of guilty constitutes a "conviction" for
purposes of the present consideration. Defendant argues, in essence, that the
prosecution of multiple offenses from a single criminal episode constitutes double
jeopardy, and therefore a violation of his constitutional rights.
The facts as recited in the State's Memorandum indicate that the paraphernalia
found by the officer was a pipe which appeared to have been used for smoking
marijuana. The felony charge is for possession of methamphetamine. While there is
no question that the two offenses involve conduct closely related in time, the Court is of
the opinion that the two offenses are not a single criminal episode because they do not
have a common criminal objective. There is no evidence that the marijuana pipe was,

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 971100051 FS
Page 2

or could be, used to ingest or consume the methamphetamine. Therefore, the
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is denied.
The Court is surprised that there are no Utah appellate cases dealing with the
issue of a separate citation and subsequent prosecution through formal criminal
Information. Because this issue is unclear, law enforcement would certainly be better
advised to cease the practice of issuing a citation for a misdemeanor, when forwarding
reports to the prosecutor which likely will result in felony charges.
DATED this 2H

day of November, 1997.

Case No: 971100051
Date:
Aug 12, 1997
CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE
I certify that a copy of the enclosed toatevaem was sent to the
following people by the method and on the date specified.
DATE

METHOD

08/12/1997

Mail

08/12/1997

Mail

NAME
JON J. BUNDERSON
45 NORTH 1ST EAST
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302
KEVIN MCGAHA
P.O. Box 4 6
Brigham City UT 84302

Deputy Court7Clerk

Page 3 (last)

ROGER F. BARON, DEPUTY
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
4 5 NORTH 100 EAST
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 84302
TELEPHONE: (801) 734-9464

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
:
:

RESPONSE TO MOTION AND
NOTICE TO SUBMIT
FOR DECISION

:

Case No. 971000051

Plaintiff,
vs.
KALOB TED KEPPLER,
Defendant.
COMES NOW the state of Utah by and through Roger F. Baron,
Deputy County Attorney, and responds to the Motion to Dismiss of
the defendant and further hereby notifies the Clerk to submit the
Motion filed in the above-captioned matter for decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The above defendant was arrested on April 5, 1997 for

the offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a FeJony of
the 3rd Degree (Methamphetamine), Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a Class "B" Misdemeanor.

It is alleged that the

defendant had methamphetamine in his possession, that he had
marijuana in his possession and that he has a pipe used to ingest

controlled substances in his possession.

The police report noted

that the defendant was the passenger in a vehicle that was
stopped by the police.

A pat down of the defendant was done and

a suspicious bulge in the defendant's levis led to the production
of the pipe.

The pipe contained a burnt substance that had a

smell of burnt marijuana.

The officer requested the defendant to

produce any other hidden items and he produced a small black,
white and purple bag with a tan leather bottom and a draw string.
The bag contained a tin box.

Inside the tin box were located

several baggies.

One contained marijuana and several contained

methamphetamine.

The defendant was arrested.

2.

The officer wrote a ticket to the defendant for the

charge of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (based on possession
of the pipe) and sent the ticket to the court.
filed with the court on or about April 8, 1997.

The ticket was
The clerk sent a

notice to the defendant to appear on April 21, 1997 for
arraignment.

The officer forwarded the reports to the Box Elder

County Attorney's office and those were received April 10, 1997.
3.

For some reason not shown by the file, the defendant

appeared early at 9:00 a.m. on April 14, 1997 and entered a
guilty plea to the ticket and was sentenced.

That same afternoon

at about 2:00 p.m., the state filed a formal information which
included the charge the defendant plead to and the two others
noted above.

The court clerk noticed that the defendant had

already plead to the ticket and placed a copy of the ticket and
2

the sentence in the file containing the formal information.
4.

The defendant waived his preliminary hearing on August

12, 1997 and now files this Motion to Dismiss based on the single
criminal episode statutes and the double jeopardy provisions.
ARGUMENT
The state does not argue that the defendant should be tried
again on the charge of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia inasmuch
as he has already plead guilty and been sentenced for that crime.
Therefore, the state does not oppose a removal of that crime from
the present information.
The remaining issue is whether the guilty plea of the
defendant to a ticket on the same day that formal charges were
filed somehow prevents prosecution of the remaining
non-duplicative formal information charges.
The first thing that should strike the court is the fact
that we are not dealing with two formal informations filed by a
prosecutor's office.

The statutes dealing with multiple trials

for offenses in a single criminal episode were intended to avoid
a prosecutor knowingly charging offenses piecemeal and if beat on
one, then filing another until he obtains a conviction.

This is

why Section 76-1-402(2) (b) requires the offenses to be known to
the prosecuting attorney at the time of the arraignment on the
first information or indictment.

The defendant was not arraigned

on the first information or indictment until he had already plead
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guilty to a ticket (a ticket is not an information, but under
certain circumstances can be used in lieu of an information as
per section 77-7-21, UCA.)

There is a good reason why the

^irsnrte refers to an information or indictment and not to a
ticket.

Officers issue tickets directly to the offender and then

file them with the court without them ever going through a
prosecution screening.

The only way a prosecutor normally hears

about a ticket is when the charge is denied and the case set for
a trial.
Because the prosecutors office did not even know about the
ticket at the time the defendant plead yuilty to il, multiple
trials are allowed and the statute referred to does not apply.
We can easily imagine circumstances where a dismissal of the
later charges would not be what the statute intended.

For

example, suppose a motorist is speeding and intoxicated and while
driving kills a pedestrian.

Imagine further that the officer

gives the defendant a citation for speeding and DUI and the
prosecutor's office files a formal information for auto homicide.
If the defendant quickly plead to the speeding and DUI ticket,
the defendant would have the court rule that he cannot be
prosecuted for auto homicide.

Of course that would appear to be

not what the statute intended, hence the language about an
information or indictment.
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If the court in spite of the above decides that the statute
does apply to this situation, it must then determine whether the
non-duplicative counts are part of a single criminal episode with
the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia.
The most recent decision outlining the method of determining
issues such as the one in the present case is that of State vs.
Strader, 902 P2d 638 (Utah App. 1995).
The court must begin its analysis by examining the two prong
definition of ''single criminal episode" found in the Utah
Criminal Code: "all conduct which is closely related in time and
is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective."

Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-401.

If multiple offenses meet the definition of a single
criminal episode, we then look to Section 76-1-403, UCA to
determine whether the former prosecution of one offense precludes
the later prosecution of another.
The initial question is whether the non-duplicative offenses
charged are part of a "single criminal episode."

If they are

not, the above rules do not come into play and separate
prosecutions can occur.
In giving guidance to other courts in how to analyze the
term single criminal episode, the court of appeals noted on page
3 of the decision in St. vs. Strader that "we believe it is
appropriate to take a narrow, rather than an expansive view of
what that term entails."

The Strader case involves the same
5

issue as the present case (although Slrader involvod found]
prosecutions on all charges and not a ticket.)

In Strader, a

separate prosecutors office prosecuted a misdemeanor for which
the defendant plead guilty and then later was charged with a
felony and the misdemeanor by the County Attorneys office.
There is no question that the present case involves conduct
closely related in time.

The issue then is whether the offenses

are "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective".

The standard used is an objective standard

to see whether under the totality of the circumstances the charge
ol Possession ol Drug Parapherna L La LS jncjdenl Lo I he
accomplishment of the-^ame criminal objective as the charges for
Possession of a Controlled Substance (marijuana and/or
methamphetamine.)

Objectively, the defendant intended to possess

an object which was to be used to ingest marijuana.

The intent

to possess the pipe may have been incidental to the intent by the
defendant to possess the marijuana (since that was what the pipe
was used to ingest), but certainly, it was not in any way
incidental or related to the objective intent to possess the
methamphetamine.

Therefore, the crime of possession ol

methamphetamine is not part of a single criminal episode with the
crime of possession of drug paraphernalia where the paraphernalia
was unrelated to the methamphetamine.

The defendant would have

the court use a more expansive interpretation and expansively
find that the intent to use illicit drugs was the intent the
6

court should focus on.

This is in direct contradiction to the

advice given in Strader.
The state concedes that it would be aiiticult tfd> argue that
the misdemeanor possession of marijuana was not related to the
possession of a pipe used to ingest the marijuana.

However, the

methamphetamine possession has no direct or implied connection
with the paraphernalia charge.
CONCLUSION
The statutes on prosecution of multiple offenses in a single
t rial do not apply to the situation where the original charge was
not i-iled through an J niumuil ion or m d Lcl menl .

Theieiore, I ho

subsequent prosecution is not barred.
In the alternative, using the recommended restrictive
approach, the intent to possess methamphetamine has no direct
connection with the intent to possess drug paraphernalia used to
ingest marijuana and they are therefore not part of a single
criminal episode.
DATED September 2, 1997.

/) //

ROGErt£*Y BARON
DEPUTY BOX Kl.DKK COUNTY ATTOKNI Y
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTION AND NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION to the attorney for defendant:
KEVIN MCGAHA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 4 6
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302
postage prepaid, this ^

— day of September, 1997
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IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
H-/^-^7

SENTENCING DATE:
[ t/] STATE OF UTAH
[ ]

] BRIGHAM CITY
CITY
Plaintiff

VS

ncllab led

Xe.pp/rL\r
Defendant

Tape No..

BC

TIME:

Aud'iC

)
*
)
*
)
*

Tape.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
PROBATION

CASE # 37/-///7
ATTY:
Digit Begin.

End

The above named defendant having [ ]been adjudged guilty [ *^jentered
a guilty plea [ 1 entered a No Contest plea to the charge(s) of:
HB Count 1 Us<& *r P*s^.
r>£ Druy
PardLp/i
on */•/*/-<?7 Count 2
on
,
Count 3

on

IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT AS FOLLOWS:
JAIL l*Q days, suspend foO days. [ ]Concurrent [ ]Consecutive
JAIL
days, suspend
days. [ ]Concurrent [ ]Consecutive
JAIL
days, suspend
days. [ ]Concurrent [ ]Consecutive
Balance of jail sentence :o be suspended upon completion of [ ]Work
Project of
hours [<^3uccessful probation [ ]Payment of fine
Credit for time served
FINE $ 2 5 Q
Inc Suspend $_
Plus $_
_f ee
FINE $
[]Fee Inc Suspend $_
Plus $_
_fee
FINE $_
[]Fee Inc Suspend $_
Plus $_
fee
Bail Ordered
[ ]Refunded $
[ ]Forfeited $
Fine is to b
aid in installments of $>/£C
.per
rfLfirtfh
be pai<
beginning
~ *~ Fine to be worked off
.work p r o j e c t h o u r s due
on
TOTAL FINES &JR5Q
RESTITUTION [

]Ordered

to.

^Amount $_

mo's or as dirertpd-fi 1 & certificate w/court
ALCOHOL: [ J/!fCounseling
[ ]Home Study certificate due
from
_mo's. [ ] BRMH [ ] other.
[ JMental Health Counseling
PROBATION: The defendant is placed on [ ] AP&P [i^T^Court probation
for
/ IX
mos. during such time he/she shall abide by the normal
probation agreement and by the following: [ ]Waive Search & Seizure
[ ]Random Drug Test [ ]Write letter monthly [ ]Do not go where alcohol
consumed & sold [ ]Don't consume alcohol IVTViolate no laws. The Court
retains jurisdiction to make further orders as it may deem necessary.

Cm fife & CAtrt/oaP
F/MJ/ZL
Jv pint? ~rar Ccunxeti na
Review dlate
Date
DEFENDANT may appeal this judgmen
in SLC.

is /on

<H) jth?

sr&t,/*j

~EM

Ju
days to Co

t of Appeals
0025J (2)

ADDENDUM B

Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-403,
Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising
out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried
under section 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) Resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or
(iii) Was improperly terminated; or
(iv) Was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a
fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of
facts or in a determination that there was insuflBcient evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of
guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction
for the lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set aside, or
vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place before
the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is
sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would make
any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state makes it
impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
[emphasis added]

